From an evolutionary perspective, the role of public policy extends far beyond the mere correction of market failures emphasized by neoclassical microeconomics. Public policy may facilitate the market process. It may also guide the market process (in the case of multiple equilibria). The State can finally play a more creative role by allowing private agents to individually or collectively satisfy certain goals unattainable through market forces alone. However, this paper shows that although the scope of useful public policies is broader in an evolutionary approach than in neoclassical economics, the government's ability to direct the evolution of the economic system is highly limited. This paper also proposes an attempt to formulate certain normative criteria which could act as public policy guidelines in an evolutionary perspective.
Introduction
"The ability of a theory to illuminate policy issues ought to be a principal criterion by which to judge its merit" (Nelson and Winter, 1982) . Hence in order to assess the contribution of the evolutionary paradigm with regard to neoclassical economics, the examination of its contribution to the positive and normative analysis of the economic role of the State turns out to be essential. However, so far most of the works dealing with the role of the State in an evolutionary framework are marked by an empirical dimension and are sector-oriented.
Evolutionary economists have long considered science and technology policy as a favored topic (Metcalfe, 1994 (Metcalfe, , 1995 Lipsey and Fraser, 1997) . They have also taken an interest in industrial policy (Gerybadze, 1992; Saviotti, 1995) , in environmental policy (Ayres, 1991; Mondello, 1996) and in competition or anti-trust policy (Possas and Fagundes, 1998; Malerba et al., 2001) . What emerges from these works, and from the very few papers that specifically deal with the issue of public policy in an evolutionary perspective (especially chapter 16 of Nelson and Winter, 1982 ; Nelson and Soete, 1988 ; Hodgson, 1999) , is that it exists a belief amongst evolutionary economists that stronger, and at least different, policy implications may be derived from evolutionary paradigm, usually of an interventionist nature. But surprisingly enough, Nelson and Winter's 1982 book remains of a very general nature on that topic, as well as Hogdson's Economics and Utopia that just highlights the role of public policy to "foster learning, enhance human capacities, systematically incorporate growing knowledge and adapt to changing circumstances". This paper aims to offer a more rigorous view on public policy issues in an evolutionary perspective. The expected results of this research are triple: establish a typology of the new roles of the State in such a perspective; undertake a survey of the main drawbacks encountered by an evolutionary policy maker; propose guidelines for an evolutionary public policy in which interventionism attempts to limit and shape market outcomes without however (intentionally) suspending the market order. It will be shown that in evolutionary microeconomics, the role of public policy extends far beyond the mere correction of market failures. Several roles are assigned to the State. Public policy may facilitate the market process. It may also guide the market process (in the case of multiple punctual attractors). The State can finally play a more creative role by allowing private agents to individually or collectively satisfy certain goals unattainable through market forces alone.
However, in the more realistic framework of the economic system displayed by the evolutionary approach, the success of public intervention is truly uncertain. The scope of useful public policies is broader than in orthodox microeconomics, but the government's ability to direct the evolution of the economic system is highly limited. Furthermore, the answer to the question "what should the State do?" becomes much less clear-cut as soon as the neoclassical paradigm -and thus the welfare maximization criterion -is abandoned.
Hence, in the simplest situations considered in this paper optimality still has a meaning (at least for the modeler and for a hypothetical perfectly-informed State), but in more complex cases certain normative criteria should be formulated to possibly act as public policy guidelines. Such an attempt turns out to be one of the core issues in this contribution. This paper goes beyond a mere survey devoted to an organized presentation of the evolutionary thinking on that topic. Thus, each of the evolutionary roles of the State put forward in the paper is illustrated with formal models which, though quite simple, emphasize the robustness of the argumentation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to a comparison of the aims, the context and the pitfalls of public intervention between orthodox microeconomics and the evolutionary approach. Next a typology of the various roles of the State in an evolutionary framework is proposed. The role of facilitating the market process is the subject of section 3.
Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to the roles of omniscient-guidance and ignorant-guidance of the market process and section 6 to the creative role of the State. Section 7 proposes a sketch of a set of normative criteria for public policies and some brief concluding comments are exposed in section 8.
Prior to developing these various points, a final but nevertheless very important remark has to be made. Throughout this contribution the words State, Government and Policymaker(s) will be used synonymously. Indeed, the very nature of the public sector (various agencies, institutions and public firms form a set of public policy-makers headed by the government) will be ignored here, although the ability of these various policy-makers to cooperate or, on the contrary, to compete against each other turns out to be a core factor in the success or failure of public policy. Such a hypothesis allows to focus on the main features of public intervention in an evolutionary context and could be relaxed in future works.
From the corrective role of the State in neoclassical microeconomics to an evolutionary perspective
In neoclassical works, the legitimization of public intervention is twofold. On the one hand, the general law and economics program that developed in the 1960s and 1970s, accompanied by new institutional neoclassical economists, consider that it is one of the roles of the State to define and shape, through legislatures and courts, the framework of economic activities of individuals and firms (see Commons (1934) for pioneer works). The State establishes the "rules of the game". It does not act as a player but rather as the referee. It imposes firms to inform consumers on product quality and conduct quality checks. The State also sets up institutions that arbitrate disputes, lay down penalties and ensure their enforcement. On the other hand, the correction of market failures acts as another -and major -justification for public policy, which is then considered as an intentional modification of market mechanisms (see Pigou (1920) ). Such failures characterize a situation in which the market process does not lead spontaneously to a Pareto-optimum (a situation in which no individual can be made better off without damaging the situation of at least another individual). The statement that a decentralized economic system can be at least as efficient as a centralized one is encompassed in the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics. They state, on the one hand, that unconstrained market forces always lead to a Pareto-optimum and, on the other hand, that any given optimum can be reached through a free market process as soon as appropriate changes have been made in initial endowments of individuals. Thus, only situations of undoubted market failures may justify a public intervention with an allocative purpose.
Usually, three well-known types of market failures are put forward: the existence of a natural monopoly, the existence of public goods and the existence of external effects. For two decades, incomplete markets and imperfect information have been revealed as another source of market failures. State intervention turns out to be useful in the case of individuals unable to protect themselves against uncertainty due to the lack of corresponding contingent markets (incomplete markets), or when moral hazard and adverse selection situations (imperfect information and especially information asymmetries) exist. For instance, a moral hazard situation may stem from the impossibility to ensure that an individual really behaves according to his commitment stipulated by contract. Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1985 stressed the weakness of market order when confronted to such opportunistic behaviors. Under the hypotheses of assets specificity, bounded rationality, uncertainty and opportunistic behaviors, the market generates so much transaction costs that it has to be replaced by a hierarchy. To minimize these transaction costs, the market order and individuals behavior may for instance be supervised by public institutions endowed with an incentive and/or coercive power. Thus, in economies in which there are incomplete markets and imperfect information, government intervention (e.g. taxes and subsidies, setting-up of institutions) exists that can make every one better off (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986; Stiglitz, 1989; Arnott et al., 1994) . What is the reason for such an advantage of the State over the market? It relies on the fact that government has at its disposal more incentive devices than market participants to direct decisions of private parties. The State has three privileges -the power to tax, the power to prescribe, the power to punish -and a greater ability than the market to reduce transaction costs (through the management of adverse selection problems in the insurance area for instance) and to facilitate and support networking activities and cooperation.
Yet, this particularly narrow domain of useful public intervention is questioned. The famous Coase theorem states that, as soon as propriety rights are clearly distributed among individuals and freely tradable, private agents may exchange these rights with mutual benefits for all of the parties involved. However, as underlined by Coase (1992) himself, as soon as the zero transaction cost hypothesis is lifted, the State retains an undeniable advantage over the market to solve certain market failures. However, in a neoclassical perspective, the legitimization of public intervention needs to show that market failures are large enough to outweigh government failures. Stiglitz (1989) puts forward that there are often stronger incentives to avoid mistakes in the private sector than in the public sector. Human errors arise in the private sector just as they do in the public, but all of us have to pay for the mistakes in the public sector, while only the voluntary members (shareholders, management, workers) do in the private sector. The State is also constrained by imperfect information. For instance, in the relation between a government and a natural monopoly, information asymmetries clearly exist. The monopolist is better informed on the optimal price and output level than the regulator. Generally speaking, the various sources of public failures which can lead governments to undertake mistaken interventions are the following: imperfect information, separation between those who benefit and those who pay, bureaucratic capture, pressure group activity and political myopia. Hence, the demonstration of the existence of market failures is insufficient to truly legitimize State intervention in the market process. A pertinent assessment of the extent of possible public failures is also essential. Dixit (1993) asserts that "there is no market failure so bad that the US Government and political process could not do even worse".
Even in the case of market failures, a free market process is still the least bad solution. Stiglitz does not share a so negative perception of public intervention. He states that there is real scope for public intervention but we have to compare market failures and public failures to decide on the desirable nature of public policy. "For some types of public intervention, the full costs of government intervention, taking into account the inevitable public failures, may be less than the benefits arising from correcting (or improving upon) market failure" (Stiglitz, 1989, p. 56) .
Therefore the public policy issue as it stands in orthodox microeconomics mainly focuses on the divide between the opponents of any public intervention and the supporters of intervention whose scope is restricted to dealing with market failures. Such a divide encompasses a large ideological component. Indeed, it seems difficult to conclusively decide between, on the one hand, analytical demonstrations of the possible market process suboptimality and, on the other hand, the amassed empirical observations which illustrate the sometimes perverse or ill-structured nature of public policies. However, neoclassical microeconomists generally agree that a State with a welfare-maximizing goal, and perfect information 1 on its environment and on the consequences of its decisions, should be able to efficiently correct market failures and lead the economic system to a Pareto-optimal equilibrium 2 . The economic role of the State is a corrective one.
In an evolutionary perspective, the strengthening of the economic role of the State rests on the adoption of a paradigm which contrasts with the hypotheses of the neoclassical theory.
First of all, evolutionary theory refutes the neoclassical focus on a steady state of the economic system. The equilibrium, either linked to the stability of the various variables or to the stability of the rate of change of these variables, cannot be considered as the main pattern of an economic system. The economic process is an ongoing process. In an evolutionary perspective, the State as well as all the economic agents, can not be considered to be endowed with a substantive rationality. How can its decisions be shaped by a utility function maximization whereas future states of nature are unknown and, anyway, its ability to gather and deal with information is not unlimited? Therefore, the State often adopts a satisficing and adaptive behavior. Satisficing because the State, as well as firms and consumers, makes a decision as soon as an option which fulfills some pre-set subgoals is found. It does not look indefinitely for a hypothetical best decision. Thus, at any time, public policies are implemented by organizations largely as a matter of "organizational routines".
Adaptive because economic agents adapt continuously their behavior to changes in their environment. In an evolutionary world, the aim of public decisions is to improve a given situation according to given criteria (adaptive efficiency) and not maximize a given welfare function. Public decision makers are supposed to be able to compare different solutions and to settle on the one which seems to be socially preferable for a given length of time. But the hypothesis of an optimizing State has to be given up.
Should the State be considered as concerned with collective welfare and the respect of individual preferences? There is no reason to question the present orthodox point of view on that subject. Due to lobbying and bureaucratic capture, the actual goal of public policy may sometimes dramatically wander from the maximization of a inter-temporal collective welfare.
However, in this paper, the strong hypothesis of a State concerned with collective welfare still holds and we also suppose the State to be free from any conflict among its different components (government, public agencies, local authorities, …). In a nutshell, we suppose the State to be confronted to a knowledge problem but not to an incentive problem. Indeed, we don't need to assume that the State does not always seek to improve collective welfare to remarkably enrich the analysis of public policy. Of course, such a hypothesis has to be relaxed in future works.
Assuming a State concerned with collective welfare, should we consider the evolutionary policy maker endowed with large capabilities to direct the economic system? Of course, the evolutionary policy maker has the very same power than the neoclassical policy maker (see above). However the evolutionary approach emphasizes two major drawbacks encountered by the State in its attempt to pilot the economic system dynamics: the irreversibility of some actions and, especially, the historicity of economic processes (irreversibility of time). Previous choices made by economic agents constrain the set of their future opportunities. Economic process is similar to a course on a road in which, more often than not, U-turns are impossible and branching off difficult. Hence, whereas the economic system is often characterized by several punctual attractors, some of them being considered as socially more desirable, the transition from one attractor to another may be impossible.
Furthermore, once the system is on its way toward a given attractor, sometimes its course can no longer be deviated. According to evolutionary theorists, history does matter. Public policies are also prone to irreversibility and path-dependency. The ability of a tax, a subsidy or an antitrust policy to achieve its goal depends dramatically on the date of implementation (sometimes its too late, sometimes too hasty) and on the path previously followed by the economic system.
To conclude, let us emphasize that the issue of the optimization concept turns out to be crucial in the analysis of public intervention in an evolutionary framework. According to neoclassical theory, the possible inability of the market process to sometimes achieve collective welfare maximization defines the scope of public policy. Does such a scope appear broader than the mere market failures concern as soon as an open-ended universe is considered? The answer to such a question is undoubtedly positive in an evolutionary approach. Indeed, this belief seems to be shared by most of evolutionary authors. Hodgson (1999) emphasizes that flexibility and adaptability are not necessarily gained by giving markets full rein. According to Metclafe (1995) , a central purpose of policy now becomes that of enhancing the learning processes in firms and other institutions to generate variety in behavior 3 . The central concern of the evolutionary policy maker is the innovation process and the central policy problem becomes that of increasing the probability of experimental behavior. Indeed, according to Nelson and Soete (1988) , the processes of economic change are continuously tossing up new externalities that must be dealt with in some manner or other.
More often than not, prevailing laws and policies will not contain them adequately. Then, occupying a central place in the policy analysis, are now the notions that society ought to be engaging in experimentation and that the information and feedback from that experimentation will be crucial in guiding the evolution of the economic system. In other words, there is an essential governmental role in monitoring as well as encouraging innovation. Thus, Nelson and Winter (1982) stressed that "flexibility, experimentation, and ability to change direction as a result of what is learned are placed high on the list of desiderata for proposed institutional regimes". Nelson and Winter (1982) only highlight that governments are quite limited in the things they can do well, and that therefore policy analysis should be concerned with these constraints as well as with the inefficiencies of private action.
But once again, apart from emphasizing that public institutions may have contradictory goals and that government-business coordination may be disrupted by business rivalry, the pitfalls public policies have to thwart in an evolutionary perspective are not elicited. As for Hodgson (1999), he just emphasizes that reigning uncertainty and incomplete knowledge make any fully rational policy impossible, and that all policies are thus fallible and must be explicitly provisional and practically adaptable. Hence, this paper aims at providing a comprehensive presentation of the role of the State in an evolutionary perspective as well as of pitfalls an evolutionary policy-maker has to avoid.
The State as a facilitating institution of the market process
Only a few hypotheses put forward by neoclassical microeconomics have to be removed to illustrate this first non-orthodox role of the State. For instance, we will assume in this section the existence of a unique stable state. The State may however find a role in the economic game as soon as we assume that individuals and firms adopt adaptive rather than optimizing behavior and we consider the dynamic feature of the economic process. Lesourne's (1992) model of an evolutionary labor market provides a simple though comprehensive framework to analyze this facilitating role of the State. In this market, agents are assumed to adopt an adaptive and poorly sophisticated behavior. Each worker k displays a minimum wage ) (k w below which he refuses to be employed. Each firm i, which has at the most one employee, proposes a maximum wage ) (i v above which it does not hire anybody.
An illustrative model
(.) w and (.) v therefore represent the usual supply and demand functions in this labor market.
Due to the lack of a walrasian auctioneer to clear the market, for each period a (worker, firm)
couple is randomly drawn and the two parties meet. The outcome of this meeting can be positive (the worker is hired) or a failure but, in any case, it can generate an adjustment of wage requirements of both the worker and the firm. If for a period t the wage demanded by an unemployed worker is considered as too high by the firm and leads it to delay its hiring, the worker will reduce his wage requirement for period t + 1. As for a firm which cannot manage to find an employee at a given wage, it will raise its hiring wage for the next period. On no account however will the wage requirement of a worker k decrease below ) (k w and the wage offered by a firm i exceed ) (i v .
After an exploration period whose length is random, this system comprising interacting workers and firms converges toward a stable state. The main features of such a state are the following: (i) any new contact between a (worker, firm) couple is condemned to fail since every unemployed individual has reduced his wage requirement to its minimum threshold while the wage offered by every firm without any employee has reached its maximum; (ii) all wages are equal (uniqueness of price) and supply equals demand. In such a stable state, the total surplus is maximum 4 which was only a very exceptional outcome in transient states.
Since the exploration time of the system induces welfare losses, any shortening of the "tatonnement" period should be undoubtedly considered as efficient even according to orthodox microeconomics.
A specific role for the State
In this model we still deal with a market process which displays the main features of the emblematic neoclassical market: a unique equilibrium characterized by a maximum total surplus. The only specificity relies on the lack of a walrasian auctioneer which results in the convergence not being instantaneous. This convergence is the fruit of a process of random meetings between workers and firms and of rather crude adjustments in their behaviors. What role could the State play in such a model? A perfectly informed State might deal with the information provided by firms and workers and then set the equilibrium wage. The State would then be nobody else than the walrasian auctioneer. In a more realistic perspective, the State could play the role of a facilitating device by providing coordination between workers and firms 5 . In Lesourne's model, public intervention might ensure each firm (worker) can make contact with more than one worker (firm) at each meeting. The likelihood of each agent concluding a contract would increase and the correction process by both the firms and workers would speed up. Let us take an example. If during period t a worker notices that all of the firms m he contacted simultaneously found the wage he asked was unacceptable, he will surely correct significantly his requirements during period t + 1. In the previous model, to obtain the same outcome the adjustment process would have been prolonged until period t + m. In such a market, a specific role can thus be assigned to the State: set up an institutional environment favoring contacts between workers and firms. Such a role is usually provided in western economies by Public Employment Services which aim to encourage the widespread exchange of information between workers and firms. Wakeley (1998) proposes an argumentation along the same lines to legitimize certain technology policy measures. He assumes that several firms are in competition in a stable technological environment but which remains ex ante unknown. Some of the firms' technological choices are undoubtedly preferable in the sense that they lead to a maximal total surplus. Wakeley shows that though market forces systematically lead to the emergence of the fittest market structure regarding the technological environment, the convergence process may be lengthy. Economic agents could thus encounter significant welfare losses during this process. Public intervention may involve prompting firms (e.g. through subsidies) to explore thoroughly their technological environment in order to accelerate the discovery of the best technological choices.
As soon as the dynamic feature of the economic process and the usually adaptive behavior are truly considered, a new role appears for the State even in the case of a market destined to converge towards a unique equilibrium. This "facilitator" role aims to accelerate the market's natural adjustment process and as a result avoid some welfare losses in transient periods.
The State as an omniscient guide of the market process
Let us now consider the case of multiple punctual attractors. In such a case, a much more significant role is assigned to public policy. In this section, a pure abstract hypothesis still holds: the State is perfectly informed. The policy maker knows that multiple punctual attractors do exist and knows their respective merits. In other words, among the several punctual attractors the State is unambiguously able to identify which one will provide maximum welfare to society as a whole 6 . By maintaining such a particularly unrealistic hypothesis we can nevertheless assess step-by-step what we can learn from the comparison of neoclassical with evolutionary teaching on the economic role of the State. This hypothesis will be lifted in the next section.
Dealing with dynamic economic systems characterized by two or more attractors, where one of them is considered objectively as more desirable, leads to the contributions of Arthur (1988 Arthur ( , 1989 and David (1985) on technological competition processes. In these papers, two goods or two technologies compete in a single market and, due to the existence of positive externalities (network externalities, pecuniary externalities, …), the probability that either one of them will be chosen in the future by consumers depends on its past adoption rate. These models exhibit distinctive features of evolutionary systems: irreversibility, path-dependence, crucial role of randomness. However, an unconvincing hypothesis is usually adopted in technological competition models. In Arthur's model, for instance, competing technologies appear simultaneously on a virgin market. It seems much more realistic to consider a new technology (product) entering a market held by one or several well-established technologies (products). Therefore, we developed a specific model which displays such a competition timing.
An illustrative model
Let us assume two imperfectly substitutable goods manufactured by two firms labeled k (k = 1, 2) 7 . Using a clean technology, firm 1 sells an environmentally friendly product whereas firm 2 produces a polluting good. However, firm 1's technology is an emerging one and induces a unit production cost higher than the unit production cost of product 2. More precisely, at the beginning of the competition process, which lasts T periods, firm 1 bears a higher unit production cost. However, if product 1 encounters in the subsequent periods a sufficiently high growth in its market share, its unit production cost could dramatically decrease (due to a blend of scale and learning economies). Stemming from a mature technology, product 2, as for it, can only experience a slight and constant decrease in its unit production cost in response to a rise in its market share.
Let, for each time period t, c 1 (t) be the relative unit production cost of product 1 with respect to product 2 and P 1 (t) be firm 1's market share. For each time period t, R 1 (t) represents the threshold market share for firm 1 such that:
In other words, if a sufficiently high number of consumers chooses product 1, P 1 (t) > R 1 (t), and thus the unit production cost of this product would decrease faster than its competitor's unit production cost. On no account, however, can the relative unit production cost of product 1 fall below a threshold level c 1 * , which will be considered as a technological frontier. In the opposite case, if P 1 (t) < R 1 (t), the relative unit production cost of product 1 increases and weakens its ability to enhance its market share in the subsequent periods.
Let us present now the demand-side of this market. During time period t, some individuals enter the market and each of them buys one unit of one of the two competing products. Vis-à-vis the product k, a consumer labeled i displays a utility given by the following function 8 :
[2] has the same probability of being drawn and chooses to buy the product which provides him with the largest utility. The market share of product 1 in time period t is thus a random variable. Since individuals who enter the market in a given period always display a specific environmental awareness, they trade off differently between the price and the environmentally friendly nature of the product.
The various possible dynamics of the competition process depend on the initial unit production costs of firms 1 and 2 and on the size of scale economies and learning economies phenomena. The usual features of such dynamics is depicted in figure 1 . By assuming that for each time period the number N of actual consumers is large enough, the random feature of the demand function can be neglected. Hence, for each time period t, if the relative unit production cost of product 1 with respect to product 2 exceeds a, this relative cost will constantly increase during the following periods (because P 1 (t) < R 1 (t)) and firm 1's market share will tend towards zero. In the opposite case, if c 1 (t) < a, P 1 (t) > R 1 (t) and thus the relative cost of product 1 tends towards c 1 * and its market share towards one (under the assumption c 1 * < 1).
----------FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE ----------Hence, this process displays two punctual attractors corresponding either to a monopoly held by firm 1 or to a monopoly held by its competitor 9 . Let us assume that a uniform consumption of product 1 is socially preferable; this will undoubtedly be the case if both of the following conditions are fulfilled: (i) product 1 is environmentally friendly and (ii) c 1 * < 1. If c 1 (0) < a at the beginning of this competition process characterized by positive pecuniary externalities (each consumer buying a unit of a given good in period t allows other consumers to get one cheaper in period t + 1) and heterogeneous consumer preferences, market forces alone will lead the system towards the socially desired attractor 10 . In the opposite case, public intervention becomes necessary to prevent the system being locked in the inferior attractor. This intervention may naturally take the form of a modification of the products' relative cost. For instance, a policy maker who sets a tax with an appropriate rate τ on product 2, may allow the firm 1 to establish its product in a market with initially unfavorable features. Figure 2 shows the impact of such a policy measure on the initial conditions of survival for product 1. For each time period t, if a < c 1 (t) < b, imposing a tax rate τ on product 2 ensures the convergence of the system towards the socially preferred attractor.
-
Strengths and weaknesses of the State as an omniscient guide in an evolutionary system
According to orthodox microeconomics, the question of externalities induced by industrial pollution is more often than not restricted to a specific issue: the sub-optimality of the market outcomes and, more precisely, the excess level of production of the polluting product. Public policy then aims to modify market mechanisms in order to reduce pollution to an optimal level. The simple model we just presented allows a significant enrichment of the public policy issue in such a situation where several punctual attractors exist. On the one hand, we just showed that market failures are not ineluctable and it will be shown that public intervention may remain temporary. On the other hand, when public intervention turns out to be necessary to lead the economic system towards the desired attractor, the efficiency of this intervention is weakened by the dynamic aspect of the economic process.
Public policy may be temporary. Public policy measures are often long-lasting for political reasons. For instance taxes implemented to solve a particular problem, or to raise funds for a specific purpose, frequently survive the initial issue because of the balanced budget constraint. Yet, the State can act as a strictly temporary guide to the economic system.
Implementing a temporary policy provides a stimulus and is sufficient to guide the system towards the desired attractor, after which endogenous cumulative phenomena (scale and learning economies) take over the exogenous public intervention. An illustration of this proposition is provided in the following. Let us consider figure 2. If the tax policy remains useful in each time period t represented by a < c 1 (t) < b, it is different as soon as the time period t' (with t' > t) is characterized by c 1 (t') < a. From period t' onwards, the relative unit production cost between the two competing products in the absence of any public policy provides a sufficiently high market share for firm 1 to activate dynamic increasing returns.
The tax can then be withdrawn. When the existence of multiple punctual attractors is truly considered, public intervention turns out to be "richer" in an evolutionary than in a neoclassical perspective. The State no longer has to content itself with just the correction of market failures, it can provide guidance by "fine tuning" the economic system 11 . However, in view of the dynamic aspect of economic systems, uncertainty and the heterogeneity of individuals, we should also thoroughly question the control exerted by the State on an evolutionary system. Narrow window dilemma. This major public policy dilemma, underlined by David (1987) , expresses the briefness of the period during which a policy maker may successfully guide a dynamic economic system (in terms of means-goals analysis, that is to say in terms of cost-benefit analysis). In such a system, any delay in the implementation of public policy measures could turn out to be fatal to the policy maker's goals. Let us come back to figure 2.
Imagine that in time period t, the policy maker receives the information that c 1 (t) < b. He may then decide to implement a tax with a rate τ on the purchase of product 2. What will be the outcome of a delay in the implementation of such a tax? For instance, assume that the tax is only effective in period t' with c 1 (t') > b. The public policy will not succeed in stopping the erosion of firm 1's market share and thus prevent its future disappearance. Of course the tax rate may be increased but the same phenomenon is likely to recur. In other words, the later the public policy is implemented, the more costly and/or tricky it will appear. The policy maker must pay special attention to the behavior of the system in the vicinity of phase transitions. In our example, those phase transitions correspond to the latest periods during which it is possible to bend the course of the system (i.e. to ensure the long-lasting survival of product 1) through reasonable modifications to market mechanisms rather than by overtaxing or prohibiting product 2. Malerba et al. (2001) Uncertainty and heterogeneity in consumers' preferences. So far, the heterogeneity in consumers' preferences has been neglected because the number of consumers who enter the market at each time period was assumed to be high enough. Public policy turns out to be far more complex as soon as such a hypothesis is relaxed. For a given tax rate on product 2, the preferences of the first consumers to enter the market (the intensity of their sensitiveness to ecological issues) and thus their choices determine the system dynamics. A low tax rate may be sufficient to direct the system towards the desired attractor (a monopoly held by firm 1) if the first "cohorts" of consumers are convinced ecologists. On the other hand, a higher tax rate might appear to be ineffective and not able to deter the first consumers from purchasing product 2 if they have no environmental awareness at all. To sum up, depending on the random nature of the distribution of consumers' ecological sensitiveness and on the fact that market entries are spread over time, the same tax rate is not always able to ensure the survival of product 1.
The existence of multiple punctual attractors with different merits and the irreversibility of certain economic choices, lay the foundations of a specific role for public policy. Of course, we do not ignore that such a statement is already present, though poorly developed, in neoclassical thought through the notion of multiple possible equilibria developed by the formal Game Theory. The government belongs to the set of various institutions which may direct the way the game is played, the expectations and beliefs of the players, and thus its final outcome. However most existing works, see Axelrod (1997) for instance, put forth social norms as key-institutions 12 . Furthermore, they also consider that the existence of multiple equilibria could stem from not taking into account agents' expectation behaviors and coordination mechanisms other than prices (like behavioral norms for example). Yet, even assuming a policy maker knows the merits of the different punctual attractors and is concerned with social welfare, public intervention pattern turns out to be much more complex in an evolutionary framework than in the orthodox theory. The dynamic nature of the economic process, uncertainty, irreversibility, path-dependence and heterogeneous preferences make the task of the State difficult. Policy-makers experience problems in monitoring private behaviors only through incentives conveyed by the price system. Therefore, new sources of public failures appear in addition to the ones put forward by neoclassical theory (imperfect information, bureaucracy, rent seeking, etc.) 13 . Eventually, though the State knows ex ante the best punctual attractors, only highly prescriptive public policies (which prohibit or prescribe the purchase of a given product) are guaranteed to be successful. What happens now if this rather absurd hypothesis of perfect information is relaxed?
The State as an imperfectly informed guide of the market process
Henceforth, the State is assumed endowed with a bounded rationality and imperfect information. The policy maker does not know the respective merits of the punctual attractors.
He doesn't have any privileged knowledge that private agents don't. In the previous model, this means that the State does not have any a priori information on the environmental risks induced by the competing products. It will be discovered through a learning process which involves conducting public research or gathering private research results, on the characteristics of the competing products. Of course, this learning process takes place simultaneously with the competition process. 
An illustrative model
a tax is set on product k at a rate
, then the use of product k is simply prohibited.
In order to increase the realism of the model, two hypotheses have been added. On the one hand, policy maker's decisions on taxation or prohibition are considered as irreversible, whatever the evolution in the risk assessment following new research work. On the other hand, the model conforms to the fact that competition among products inducing environmental risks often brings together three types of products: products stemming from a mature and polluting production process; products stemming from an initially polluting process which has been equipped with a pollution abatement system (end-of-pipe technology); products stemming from a green technology (environmental concern has been continuous from the very first step of product design). In our model, the competition will bring together an example of each of these product types. The products are labeled as product 3, product 2 and product 1 respectively.
Due to the complexity of this model, stemming from the coupling of two random, dynamic processes of competition and research on risks, our propositions will rely on numerical simulations rather than on analytical demonstrations. Tables 2 and 3 list the values of parameters used in the simulation runs discussed here.
----------TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE ----------

Pitfalls encountered by an ignorant policy maker monitoring an evolutionary system
The goal pursued by the State is straightforward: guarantee the survival of the most environmentally friendly product. Such a goal does not seem to be out-of-reach for the policy maker since its learning process should lead to the taxation and/or prohibition of products 2 and 3 which would thus ensure a positive market share for product 1. However, more often than not this idealized scenario does not occur. Due, among others, to its higher initial unit production cost and to the random nature of the research process, product 1 can be pushed out of the market. Simulation runs based on this simple model are very instructive on the keypoints and pitfalls of public intervention in a very evolutionary framework, in which the rationality of the State is bounded and the policy maker has to gather information on the system he intends to regulate.
Exploration/exploitation dilemma. As soon as the State is not assumed to hold perfect information on the economic system, it faces a crucial dilemma. On the one hand, for any policy measure to be efficient (with respect to the goal assigned to this policy) a sufficient amount of information has to be gathered beforehand. In our example, before taking any efficient measure to support an environmentally friendly product, such a product has to be identified! On the other hand, any delay in the adoption of the supporting measure prolongs the consumption of polluting products and, above all, may lead to the premature disappearance of the clean product. The exploration/exploitation dilemma which the policy maker faces is thus the following. A too short exploration period may lead to erroneous decisions due to inadequate knowledge. But, if this exploration period is too long, once the best policy has been unambiguously identified the path followed by the system may prevent the implementation of this policy. In the case of a perfectly informed State we have shown that the sooner the public intervention occurs, the greater its chance of success is. The problem is far more complicated for an ignorant State. It has to determine the best moment to switch from a situation where the focus is on exploration (learning the merits of the products)
to a situation where it is on exploitation (alter the market process to support one of the available options). Figure 3 illustrates the difficulties experienced by the policy maker in ensuring the survival of product 1 following a delayed intervention. In the example depicted here, if the prohibition of product 3 does not occur before around t = 30 or if the taxation of product 2 is not effective before around t = 20, the market share of product 1 turns out to be insufficient to generate a decrease of its unit cost which might have otherwise ensured its durability. When measures are at last taken to diminish the consumption of polluting products, the environmentally friendly firm will have already disappeared. Conceivable reasons for such a delay are numerous. They could stem from the usual public failures highlighted by neoclassical literature (bureaucracy, lobbying activities of polluting firms, etc.). However, we would like to underline that such a delay may also result from the random nature of the research process. Other things being equal, the date on which the hazardous nature of the competing products was revealed has a very conclusive impact on the survival of a clean product because of the self-reinforcing dynamics of the economic system.
----------FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE ----------
We shown that public intervention should not be excessively delayed to maintain a possibility of deviating the autonomous course of the economic system. But, any early intervention presents certain drawbacks. For instance, this intervention is based on a small quantity of information collected. The risk of a mistaken intervention is then high. David (1987) called this situation the Blind Giant dilemma. Figure 4 shows that an early public intervention endangers the survival of product 1. Indeed, in this model, the lower the intervention thresholds, Y min and Y max , are and the higher β is, the earlier the public intervention occurs. Two winning strategies emerge from these simulation runs: (i) set up low intervention thresholds but take into account with a high inertia new research results to update risk assessments; (ii) define higher intervention thresholds and simultaneously lend more weight to the latest research results. This latter strategy seems the only realistic one 15 . It involves favoring a rather rapid inclusion of research results in the policy maker's thinking on risk while continuously taking the time to assess the quality of what has been learned. However, the implementation of such a reasonable strategy, even by a government which seeks to promote social welfare, is not an easy matter. Public policy is subject to external as well as internal constraints.
----------FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE ----------
External constraints on public policy. One of those constraints is a classical one. It stems from firms' lobbying which aims to delay public intervention. Two subgoals may be pursued by such interest groups: higher intervention thresholds and a minimal risk assessment adjustment process 16 . Obviously, such a situation does not favor the survival of product 1, and thus the success of public intervention, as shown in figure 4. Slow correction of risk assessment by the policy maker could also result from the difficulties he encounters in or to other identifiable shifts in objective conditions. They also evolve through new information gathered on the sustainable nature of past economic choices. But, the evolution of public policies -and hence their ability to fulfill the goals which they have been assignedmay also reflect less objective changes like the modification of the relative power of different interests and groups. The particular institutions and procedures for arriving at and modifying policies determine the way in which the various forces mentioned above are translated into new policy departures. Sometimes the institutional machinery for making policy seems to take on a life of its own (Nelson and Winter, 1982) 19 .
Hence, public intervention in the economic system often unfolds simultaneously with the information gathering process needed to shape this intervention. As soon as the hypothesis of an omniscient State is lifted, new issues in public policy appear but also new constraints undermine its ability to achieve its assigned goals. The major dilemma of the State changes to solving the conflict between exploration and exploitation. In parallel with the information gathering process which aims to better target public policy, the system evolves in its own way and goals may finally turn out to be impossible or too costly to reach. Furthermore, for private agents, the lengthening of the exploration period is also problematic. Certain choices (purchase of durable goods, deciding a firm's localization, technological choice, etc.) might turn out to be incompatible with the public policy eventually implemented. However, two forces which tend to extend the exploration period weaken the ability of the policy maker to solve this dilemma. The first one is the inertia in organizational routines implemented by policy makers. The other one stems from the possible difficulties encountered in collecting relevant information which is widespread among private agents.
The creative State
So far, our conception of public policy has been restricted to the monitoring and the orientation of the course of the economic system. In other words, in an evolutionary framework only politics which influence selection processes have been considered. Yet, a
clear framework for policy analysis should distinguish them from the policies which influence variety generation 20 . Increasing the variety of the set of future economic choices seems to be a reasonable policy in a context of radical uncertainty. One of the main roles of public policy is indeed to minimize risks of technological or behavioral lock-in by maintaining some diversity among the characteristics of market participants and thus in the economic trajectories followed. The central policy problem becomes that of increasing the probability and the profitability of experimental behavior. Thus the attention of the evolutionary policy maker shifts away from efficiency towards creativity. Nelson and Winter (1982) underline that when the neoclassical hypothesis of a given opportunity set is relaxed, the role of the State becomes to discover and to extend this opportunity set rather than to choose among this set to maximize an hypothetical social welfare function. Instead of the orthodox corrective role of the State, or of the facilitator or guidance roles we stressed above, we would like here to emphasize the public sector's creative role. Since the State has the power and ability to shape the market and other social institutions, its role in this context is unquestionably more significant than those played by other economic entities (Whalen, 1992) .
A formalized illustration
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Let SO = {o 1 , o 2 , …, o n } be the set of opportunities (of possible decisions) known to market participants. Among this set, the policy maker knows only the opportunities already used in the past. Let us assume that in period t, only o 1 has been realized, the subset of opportunities SUB = {o 2 , …, o n } will be unknown to policy-makers. Being interventionists, they choose a goal which requires private decision-makers to use a new opportunity. Such a goal will be achieved if any one opportunity within a subset of opportunities G = {g 1 , g 2 , …, g k } is chosen in period t + 1. Public intervention often reduces the opportunity set of market participants (some opportunities available in the past are suppressed) but it can also lead private agents to innovate. Let ISO be the set of opportunities arising from innovative activities. A condition for any public intervention to be successful is G ∩ (SO ∪ ISO) ≠ ∅. We point out that such a condition is a necessary but not a sufficient one. It is impossible to assert that market participants will always select in time period t + 1 an opportunity which belongs to G. Such a formalized illustration turns out to be useful in displaying conditions under which the State can ensure the compatibility between public goals and private agent decisions.
Firstly, the State can act as a specific market participant. It creates through public R&D a subset of new opportunities ISO, such that ISO ⊂ G, and compels private agents to adopt one of these new opportunities. This constraint may be direct (law enforcement) or indirect (market incentives). In the model developed in the previous sections, such a creative role of the State can take two forms: (i) create public firms which aim to launch environmentally friendly products or, more likely, (ii) integrate such a goal into the mission of the existing public sector firms.
Secondly, a creative State may also seek to prompt private agents to extend autonomously their opportunity set. Indeed, private agents try to adapt to any evolution in their environment (taxes/subsidies, prohibition of certain technological choices, etc.) through the selection of another option in the existing opportunity set or through an expansion of this set. Three scenarios take shape. First, market participants react to public policy without any innovation, ISO = ∅, and they select an opportunity from SO which does not belong to G (scenario I). Public intervention is a failure. Second, individuals extend their opportunity set, ISO ≠ ∅, but they select an opportunity from ISO which does not belong to G (scenario II).
Public policy turns out to be once more unsuccessful. Finally, market participants extend their opportunity set, ISO ≠ ∅, and choose an option which belongs simultaneously to ISO and to G (scenario III). Public intervention is then successful.
As an illustration of these three scenarios, let us take the example of the taxation of polluting products with some slight modifications to the hypotheses of Laffond et al.'s (2000) model. Let us assume that the launching of product 1 is conceivable only when one of the two other products is taxed. This taxation indicates that a business window is now open for an environmentally friendly product. However, it's not certain that at least one firm will always be willing to commit the needed investments. The first hypothesis is that when confronted with public intervention firms react conservatively and consequently they do not innovate.
Product 1 is not launched on the market and the consumers' choice remains restricted to products 2 and 3. Public intervention is clearly unsuccessful (scenario I). In the second hypothesis, firms do innovate. However they can content themselves with modifying their products or production processes just sufficiently to bypass the law. The actual polluting nature of their activity is not reduced. For instance, the product 1 launched on the market may not be really environmentally friendly but merely a modified version of product 2 or 3 designed to get through environmental and safety tests conducted by the government. Firms have extended their opportunity set but the implemented public policy fails to achieve the goal of favoring the development of a clean product (scenario II). In the third hypothesis, firms react to public policy measures by innovating and launching an environmentally friendly product. Public intervention may then be considered as successful (scenario III).
Public intervention as an incentive to innovate
Public policy can play the role of an incentive to innovate when confronted with risk averse market participants who are reluctant to explore promising but risky ways forwards. For instance, the public sector often conducts or supports basic research activities whose outcome and profitability are highly uncertain. So uncertain that private agents do not have any incentive to invest in such activities. Likewise, the State as a shareholder of large multinational firms is often less risk-averse than private shareholders and more willing to accept risky bets 22 . Needless to say the success of public intervention can never be guaranteed.
A creative State can give rise to innovative behaviors incompatible with collective interest.
Therefore public policy has to avoid goals which are likely to stimulate such negative innovative behavior as analyzed in scenario II, and rather choose goals which are likely to encourage beneficial innovative behavior as considered in scenario III 23 . This twofold goal suggests a possible cooperation between policy makers and private agents which simultaneously favors innovative behaviors but avoids innovations aiming solely to bypass public policy.
Towards a normative analysis of the role of the State in evolutionary microeconomics
Let us consider simultaneously an economic system with multiple punctual attractors ex ante
unknown, an open-ended universe where genuine novelties arise, and public and private economic agents both endowed with a bounded rationality. This opens the way for a renewed analysis of public intervention from a normative perspective. According to an evolutionary approach, three new roles have to be played by the State: (i) the State as a facilitating device in the market process (the simplest); (ii) the State as an imperfectly informed guide of the market process whose role is simultaneously to learn the merits of the various punctual attractors and to avoid the system becoming locked in by those that are socially less preferred;
(iii) the State as a creator of the conditions needed to ensure the economic system can achieve socially desirable goals which would have been out-of-reach through the market process alone (the most comprehensive). We have stressed throughout this paper the pitfalls such public interventions might experience. There may be a lack of synchronization between information gathering dynamics and the political and technical windows necessary for efficient monitoring of the course of the system. The public intervention may turn out to be too hasty or too late.
Such a gap originates in the random nature of research results and the novelties that occur in an open-ended world. It also stems from possible information manipulations by certain market participants or, straightforwardly, from the lack of appropriate incentives to encourage individuals and firms to share their private information. The failure of the public intervention may also be due to an overconfidence of the policy maker in his ability to direct and shape the economic system, or, in other words, to an underestimation of the complexity of private behaviors and public policy interactions. As market participants are heterogeneous in their preferences as well as in their decisions, their adaptive behavior to a change in their environment induced by public policy is particularly difficult to foresee.
Are we able to specify guidelines which might prevent policy makers falling into those pitfalls? Are we in a position to express normative propositions for an efficient public policy in an evolutionary framework? Any attempt to establish such normative propositions turns out to be a very frustrating task. Indeed, in neoclassical microeconomics, the economic role of the State is limited and the likelihood of a mistaken intervention relatively high. But the criterion to assess the desirability as well as the success of this intervention is straightforward:
government intervention is desirable if it leads the economic system to an optimal situation which would otherwise not be reached due to market failures. Although adopting an evolutionary perspective significantly extends the grounds for public intervention far from the sole need to correct market failures, the definition of a normative criterion as powerful as optimality proves to be complex. First of all, the public policy goal is no longer clear-cut.
Though we made the disputable assumption that the State is governed by public interest (see section 2), it is noteworthy that this public interest cannot be associated with neoclassical welfare unless we refer to Pareto-superiority rather than to Pareto-optimality. In an evolutionary perspective, public interest is a social agreement (possibly temporary) on values and contradictory interests among economic agents (Nelson and Winter, 1982) . It is often expressed as a set of subgoals. In neoclassical theory the market fails when it does not achieve an optimal equilibrium, in evolutionary theory it fails when it does not follow certain desired trajectories.
Hence, there is no method which tells us for once and for all which policy to pursue.
Such an approach is incompatible with a situation marked by a high degree of uncertainty, bounded rationality and unpredictable behavior. Consequently, several contributions have focused on guidelines which could help to shape public policy measures. According to Nelson and Winter (1982) , if the reference to equilibrium has to be abandoned, it seems more appropriate to think in terms of management and adaptation to economic changes. We have thus to content ourselves with much more modest goals like problem identification and search for possible improvements. Gerybadze (1992) underlines that we need a joint problem solving process or mechanism that helps us to decide rather early on, and at several consecutive intervals, whether certain success conditions are most likely to be fulfilled, whether the key participating actors will behave in a compatible way, and whether we can preclude an unacceptable risk of public policy failure. In other words, although they offer no way of deriving a set of scientifically determined welfare-maximizing policies, evolutionary models can help to develop informed judgments about the areas in which the chances of useful intervention are relatively high (Lipsey and Fraser, 1997) . The following normative propositions have been inspired by models presented in this contribution as well as by recommendations from the field of technological and industrial policies based on real case studies of the success or failure of such policies (among others, Nelson and Winter, 1982; Lipsey and Fraser, 1997; Gerybadze, 1992 ).
Rely as much as possible on market forces by improving coordination among market
participants and between them and the State. The strength of the market process is its efficiency and flexibility in terms of the decentralized and distributed collection, storage and communication of detailed information. An appropriate public policy may favor widespread dissemination of information among market participants and thus help to solve the issues of a critical mass (the system can follow autonomously the desired path as soon as a minimum number of agents make a given decision) or of the coordination of market participants (prisoner dilemma type of problems). However, on no account can the State neglect autonomous behaviors of private agents when implementing a public policy. The strategies of individuals and the public policy must be compatible. Among the key explanatory factors for failures of industrial policy, Gerybadze (1992) emphasizes that public agencies may try to "impose" a program and a new policy on firms, and that strategies of individual actors and strategies of government agencies are incompatible with each other. Reluctance to recognize the open-ended nature of the economic system and to deduce the appropriate consequences on policy maker's bounded rationality and on difficulties encountered in foreseeing and influencing private behavior, may explain the generalized lack of confidence in a explicit and directive interventionism. When neither policy maker nor private agents have perfect information, interaction and participation should be encouraged rather than setting up rigid norms (Saviotti, 1995) . Eventually, the adaptive evolutionary policy maker is far more interested in influencing and attempting to guide processes rather than imposing First of all, past sequences of policy steps have given him knowledge about the probable consequences of further similar steps. Secondly, he does not need to attempt big leaps toward his goals that would require predictions beyond his or anyone else's capability, as he never expects his policy to be the final solution to the problem. His decision is only one step, one that if successful can quickly be followed by another. Thirdly, he is in effect able to test his previous predictions as he moves on to each subsequent step. Lastly, he can often remedy a past error fairly quickly -more quickly than if policy proceeded through more distinctive steps widely spaced in time. In other words, the goal is not to define an optimal policy but rather reasonable policy in the short-run. Nelson and Winter (1982) establish an analogy with a game of chess. The final goal -win the game -is often of little use to determine the next moves. These moves have to be satisfying and above all have to prevent a quick defeat but it is rather difficult to pretend they are winning moves.
Favor exploration and tackle the exploration/exploitation dilemma. However, should incrementalism lead to exploration being neglected, the policy maker will find himself in a pre-determined path dependent situation. By prohibiting the collection of information and thus radical changes to policy, the system is prevented from leaving its initial trajectory.
Consequently, the issue of the resolution of the exploration/exploitation dilemma logically arises. Once more, given an open-ended universe in which genuine novelties arise, a robust criterion can hardly be put forward. However, it seems reasonable that the State intensifies exploration before transition phases and then gives greater place to exploitation once the system follows one of the multiple trajectories (Saviotti, 1995) . One question still remains however: how can transition phases be spotted? In a similar vein, Klein (1988) raised the issue of the static efficiency/dynamic flexibility trade-off which was first put forward by Schumpeter (1942) sixty years ago : a system that at every given point achieves a static efficiency may however in the long run, be inferior to a system that does so at no given point of time, because the latter's failure to do so may be a condition for the level or speed of longrun performance. Klein (1988) emphasizes that in promising markets, in which the propensity to engage in risk taking is therefore high, dynamic flexibility (the ability to make speedy adaptations in the face of new circumstances) may ensure higher productivity improvements, and thus a higher competitiveness, than the search for a static efficiency (make the best use of resources at every moment). As far as public policy is concerned, the trade-off is similar.
Public intervention may be, for instance, devoted either to avoid a prisoner dilemma situation among private agents by ensuring a better coordination, or to tackle environmental or social risks that the market is unable to deal with. In such situations, the expected pay-off from public policy is high as is the propensity to experiment, innovate and collect information. A policy which ensures dynamic flexibility, and thus the ability to quickly adapt to new information and circumstances, may turn out to be desirable. Consequently, one has to accept to give up any static efficiency goal. However, given the hypotheses of bounded rationality and radical uncertainty, it turns out that it is impossible to propose a robust rule to solve this trade-off. In an evolutionary context, there is no optimal amount of experimental behavior to be ex ante determined.
Build up institutions that favor the exploitation of market flexibility, incrementalism
and exploration. We have seen that exploration is necessary to possibly modify the economic system's trajectory when needed. But exploration is actually useless if an institutional structure willing to learn and to react to what has been learned does not exist. The State has to build up such a flexible structure able to modify its organizational routines. The modification of an economic system trajectory also requires more importantly that alternative trajectories are available. Flexibility requires diversity which becomes another subgoal of the evolutionary policy maker. Maintaining a diversity of possible alternative trajectories prevents at any time the system from becoming locked in a trajectory which could turn out to be unsustainable in the long run. To guarantee such a diversity of future economic choices, private agents have of course to be encouraged to adopt a innovative behavior. However, once more, a question arises. How to assess the diversity of the economic system? Unfortunately, the various contributions dedicated to this issue -often with the aim of assessing an optimal level of biodiversity -do not provide very useful public policy guidelines (see Weitzman (1992) and Merick and Weitzman (1998) ). Recommendations do not go beyond some "good sense" rules.
For example, they underline the benefit of favoring the survival of the most distant options. "Rely as much as possible on market process"; "avoid playing the sorcerer's apprentice and favor remediable decisions and information collection on the consequences of these decisions"; "build up institutions favoring the exploitation of this information, that is to say institutions aware of the risks of path-dependency in public policies, which ensure flexibility in economic choices and diversity in the alternative trajectories, and which guarantee the possibility of switching from a previous trajectory if the results of learning show this to be essential". In an evolutionary framework, the policy maker seems reduced to following some crude precepts in order to achieve fuzzy goals. Facing the rigor of the neoclassical approach to the economic role of the State in a market economy -its near-unique goal and its clear-cut precepts -the contribution of an evolutionary analysis of public policy might appear to be rather weak. While this approach renders the analysis more complex and impoverishes normative prescriptions, it is the price to be paid to take into account more realistic hypotheses on economic agents' information and behavior, on the dynamic nature of the economic system and on the open-ended nature of the world.
Conclusion
With regard to the neoclassical microeconomics perspective of public policy, the evolutionary focus of attention for public policy ceases to be market failures per se but instead turns to the enhancement of the performance of the economic system and the promotion of needed structural changes that market processes fail to achieve. Therefore various goals have to be pursued: maintain the flexibility and diversity of the economic system to prevent it from becoming locked into undesirable and irreversible trajectories, operate (or create incentives for) exploration activities, and establish institutional structures which can react to what has been learned. However, in view of the complexity of the economic system, the success of public intervention can never be guaranteed.
Hence, standard microeconomics gives the State a limited role with however a high probability of success if the incentive problem is solved. According to Austrian economists, the Hayek's "Impossibility Theorem" on a successful public intervention holds. The State has no privileged knowledge, therefore there is no reason that it should be better informed than private agents on the optimal nature of market outcomes. The State cannot be considered as more efficient than the market process to solve the coordination problem among individual decisions with the information disseminated among market participants. In fact, neoclassical and Austrian schools of thought both criticize public policy. The former underlines that even with market failures, public policy may be deviated from collective goals towards private interests. The latter denies the existence of any identifiable optimum position to use as a basis for economic regulation or economic policy of any kind. In an evolutionary perspective, the general skepticism of neoclassical theory (besides a specific fancy for competition policy) and the Austrian refusal of any positive effect of interventionism, have to be replaced by a simple "Theorem of Riskiness" (Wegner, 1997) . Regarding the wide range of possible outcomes whose end result cannot be predicted, economic policy turns out to be a risky business, shifting the risks upon society as a whole. Interestingly enough, these new roles of the State have not been completely ignored by neoclassical economists. Strategic Trade Policy and Endogenous Growth Theory represent two different streams of neoclassical theory which offer a broader role to the State than the mere correction of market process malfunctions. It turns out that these two streams display two common features familiar to evolutionary economists.
Firstly, the dynamic efficiency issue and the course of time are openly considered. Hence, the ahistorical world of neoclassical theory is somewhat qualified. Secondly, these two approaches assigned a more active role to the State. Public intervention acts as an enhancement factor either in the competitiveness of national firms or in economic growth. It should be recognized that whereas such public policy attributions seem rather heterodox in a neoclassical framework, they appear to be at the core of the evolutionary approach.
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11 Such an argument is actually more than two hundred years old. It is close to the infant industry support issue put forward by Hamilton at the end of the 18 th century to legitimize protection.
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• Correct market failures
• High uncertainty on the desirable economic trajectories
• Increase the probability of experimental behavior (Metcalfe, 1995) • Monitor as well as encourage innovation (Nelson and Winter, 1982 )
THE CONTEXT OF INTERVENTION
• Imperfect information (especially information asymmetries)
• Risky or uncertain universe (objective or subjective probabilities)
• Substantive rationality
• Radical uncertainty in an open-ended world
• Bounded rationality
ADVANTAGES OF THE STATE OVER THE MARKET MECHANISM
• Power to tax; power to prescribe; power to punish; and greater ability to reduce transaction costs and to facilitate and support networking activities and cooperation
• Greater ability than private agents to influence the economic system
• Superior coordinating ability across a diverse range of institutions (Metcalfe, 1995) 
PITFALLS THE STATE HAS TO AVOID
• Incentive problem (bureaucratic capture, lobbying, rent seeking)
• Knowledge problem (the State doesn't have any a priori better information than private agents)
• Market outcomes as well as government outcomes are subject to irreversibility and past and path dependency
DECISION CRITERIA
• Inter-temporal collective welfare maximization, or at least quasi-Pareto improvements (Stiglitz, 1998) • Problem identification and search for possible improvements in the sense of public interest which is a social agreement (possibly temporary) on values and contradictory interest among economic agents (Nelson and Winter, 1982) Threshold market share function of firm 1 R 1 (t) = θ / [1 -(1 -θ) c 1 * /c 1 (t)] θ ∈ [0,1] depicts the width of scale and learning effects associated with the production process of product 1 (the higher θ is, the lower those effects are) a As a simplification, the unit production costs of products 2 and 3 are assumed to be constant. c1(t) thus refers to an absolute cost instead of a relative cost 
